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Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe:
Lessons from a Study of Ukraine
ABSTRACT ■ This article reports a 2005–6 survey that displays the variety of
undeclared work in Ukraine, involving not only an array of ‘off-the-books’
employees but also various types of informal self-employment as well as
forms of undeclared work more akin to mutual aid. Governments pursuing a
conventional deterrent approach towards undeclared work may thus eradicate
precisely the entrepreneurship and active citizenship that they otherwise seek
to nurture. A more nuanced approach to tackling this sphere is proposed.
KEYWORDS: community participation ■ entrepreneurship ■ informal 
economy ■ public policy ■ tax compliance ■ Ukraine
Introduction
The issue of undeclared work has recently risen on the public policy
agenda, not only in the EU where it is one of the top ten priorities for
employment reform (European Commission, 2002, 2003a) but also in East-
Central European countries such as Ukraine, where the government has
stated that tackling undeclared work is its top priority (Mission of Ukraine
to European Communities, 2005; NRCU, 2005). The aim of this article is
to evaluate the extent and nature of such work and how it can be tackled.
First, the various shifts in perceptions of undeclared work and public
policy approaches will be outlined. Throughout Europe, mirroring an
earlier trend in the Third World, there has been a move away from a
wholly negative depiction of such work towards a more positive repre-
sentation of this sphere as a seedbed of entrepreneurship and enterprise
that needs to be harnessed (European Commission, 2003a, 2003b). Until
now, however, few have empirically investigated the validity of this
emergent view of undeclared work.
Second, I report a 2005/6 survey of undeclared work in Ukraine which
indicates that this sphere indeed plays a major role in the development of
enterprise and entrepreneurship. The great majority of the self-employed
surveyed in Ukraine start up their business ventures by conducting at
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least a portion of their transactions on an undeclared basis. However, this
positive role of undeclared work should not be exaggerated. On the one
hand, over a quarter of undeclared work is conducted by off-the-books
employees; on the other, a further half of all undeclared work is con-
ducted for and by relatives, friends and neighbours under work relations
more akin to mutual aid than employment. This entails a need for a more
nuanced policy approach towards this sphere.
At the outset, it is necessary to define what is here meant by undeclared
work or what has been variously called ‘informal employment’, the ‘under-
ground sector’, ‘shadow work’ and the ‘hidden economy’. The term refers
to the paid production and sale of goods and services that are unregistered
by, or hidden from the state for tax and/or benefit purposes but which are
legal in all other respects (European Commission, 1998; Grabiner, 2000;
ILO, 2002; Thomas, 1992; Williams and Windebank, 1998). It excludes both
unpaid work and work (such as drug trafficking) in which the good and/or
service provided is itself illegal; though non-declaration normally breaches
tax or social security legislation. This economic sphere, like most others,
possesses blurred edges. For example, some definitions include work per-
formed in exchange for gifts, and services such as prostitution which are il-
legal in some nations but not others. Throughout this article, only work for
monetary payment is included, and solely exchanges of goods and services
legal in the country under consideration.
Approaches Towards Tackling Undeclared Work
Until recently, undeclared work in advanced capitalist societies has largely
been viewed in negative terms as contributing little if anything to eco-
nomic and social development (Gallin, 2001; Grabiner, 2000); the con-
ventional public policy approach has thus been to eradicate such work
(Hasseldine and Zhuhong, 1999; Sandford, 1999). Most European gov-
ernments have sought to deter such working with increasingly punitive
measures, increasing the penalties and coordinating strategy and action to
improve detection rates. Such an approach has been supported by supra-
national agencies (European Commission, 1998; ILO, 2002) and many
academic commentators (Castells and Portes, 1989).
In the UK, for example, the Chancellor of the Exchequer commis-
sioned a report in 1999 which concluded that deterrence was the most
appropriate way forward. For Grabiner (2000: 19):
as long as people can profit by not declaring their work, it will be 
impossible entirely to eradicate the informal economy. Therefore, the
most effective way of tackling the problem is significantly to improve 
the likelihood of detecting and penalizing offenders. What is needed is 
a strong environment of deterrence.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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The outcome was a series of tougher penalties and improved detection
methods. These included: increased sanctions for employers and employ-
ees, tighter controls, more severe punishments, increased cooperation and
data exchange between authorities both on a national and international
level, field checks, fraud hotlines and unannounced house visits to benefit
claimants (Grabiner, 2000; Renooy et al., 2004; SBS, 2005).
In the Third World, however, it has been recognized for several decades
that the undeclared sector acts as ‘an incubator for business potential and …
transitional base for accessibility and graduation to the formal economy’,
and that many undeclared workers show ‘real business acumen, creativity,
dynamism and innovation’ (ILO, 2002: 54). During the past few years, a
similar view of undeclared work has started to emerge in Europe (Renooy
et al., 2004; Small Business Council, 2004; Williams, 2004, 2006a).
For neoliberals, undeclared workers are heroes casting off the shackles
of an over-burdensome state, and undeclared work is the ‘essence of lib-
eralism’ (Sauvy, 1984). As De Soto (1989: 255) asserts, ‘the real problem
is not so much informality as formality’. Neoliberals view the recent
growth of undeclared work as evidence of a resurgence of the free market
against state regulation and union control; hence they argue for a laissez-
faire approach towards such work combined with deregulation of the
formal economy. With fewer regulations, the notion is that the distinc-
tion between formal and undeclared work will wither away so that the
declared and undeclared spheres become inseparable; all activities would
be performed in a manner now called ‘undeclared’, although such activ-
ity would be legitimate since it would not be breaking any rules.
In recent years in Europe, this representation of undeclared work as a
site of entrepreneurship has also been taken up by a strand of social-
democratic thought, also viewing undeclared enterprise as an asset, but
only if this endeavour can be harnessed and moved into the formal econ-
omy (Renooy et al., 2004; Small Business Council, 2004; Williams, 2004,
2006a). If formalized, this would contribute to the development of an
enterprise culture and the achievement of fuller employment. This emer-
gent discourse finds a clear expression in the EU Employment Guideline
9 on undeclared work, first adopted in 2001. As the then Commissioner
Anna Diamantopoulou put it:
Member states must increase efforts to quantify undeclared work, to cut
it down and to transform it into regular employment. This is vital because
of the direct link between combating undeclared work and hitting the
Lisbon target of full employment by 2010 within a sound macroeconomic
environment. (European Commission, 2002: 1, emphasis added)
To transfer such work into the formal economy, deterrents are seen as
necessary but insufficient; they need to be combined with ‘enabling’ ini-
tiatives. As the 2003 version of the Guideline insisted, not only is there a
Williams: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
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need for push initiatives (‘sticks’) in the form of ‘improved law enforce-
ment and the application of sanctions’ but also a range of pull initiatives
(‘carrots’), namely a ‘simplification of the business environment’ and the
provision of ‘appropriate incentives in the tax and benefits system’
(European Commission, 2003b). In Ukraine similarly, although the empha-
sis is on deterrents, such as stricter sanctions, there is also a growing focus
on a limited range of incentives including the simplification of reporting
systems and the registration process as well as the provision of incentives
for labour to leave the undeclared sphere (Novoseletsky, 2000).
Whether such ‘enabling’ policy initiatives actually differ from the
neoliberal advocacy of deregulation is questionable. Though the call is
for undeclared work to be brought into the legitimate realm rather than
for the formal economy to be deregulated, the initiatives advocated seem
to amount to little more than a ‘low road’ approach that seeks to strip
away formal regulations and eliminate taxes. In this article, however, the
intention is to explore a ‘high road’ approach to legitimizing undeclared
work, in the context of an appreciation of the complex character of un-
declared work. Below, and to move towards outlining such an approach,
one of the first studies to unpack the diverse nature of undeclared work
is reported.
Undeclared Work in Ukraine
Ukraine, the second largest successor state of the former Soviet Union,
displays a wide gulf between the state and society and also severe eco-
nomic problems as it attempts to make the transition to a market society.
As the 2004 New Europe Barometer shows, there is a widespread per-
ception that public officials are corrupt. While two-thirds of the population
in new EU member states state that most officials are corrupt, 92 percent in
Ukraine believe this is the case – the highest figure in all 13 East–Central
European countries studied (Rose, 2005). Few Ukrainians believe in paying
tax since they do not trust the state to use it for redistributive or collect-
ive purposes. Given that official employment declined by about one-
third between 1990 and 1999 (Cherneyshev, 2006) and that 73 percent of
Ukrainians assert that they receive insufficient from their main income to
buy what they really need (Rose, 2005), it would be surprising if unde-
clared work were not rife.
Despite many previous surveys of the Ukraine labour market, no previ-
ous attempt has been made to collect data on undeclared work. Instead,
there have only been indirect measurement methods using proxy indicators.
According to these, such work in Ukraine is equivalent to 47–54 percent
of GDP using physical input proxies (Schneider and Enste, 2000) and
55–70 percent using currency demand (Dzvinka, 2002), while government
219-236 EJD-078254.qxd  2/6/07  4:43 PM  Page 222
estimates, based on such proxies, assert that 55 percent of Ukraine’s GDP
is produced in the undeclared sphere (NCRU, 2005).
OECD experts in their handbook on measurement methods (OECD,
2002) and the most recent European Commission report on undeclared
work (Renooy et al., 2004), as well as a host of academic evaluations
(Thomas, 1992; Williams, 2004, 2006a; Williams and Windebank, 1998)
have questioned the validity of such proxy measures and called for the
use of direct surveys. Reflecting this, the European Commission is cur-
rently conducting a feasibility study for a Europe-wide direct survey of
undeclared work (European Commission, 2005).
An initial attempt to collect data on undeclared work in Ukraine was
therefore conducted, involving face-to-face structured interviews with 
600 households. Given that previous studies in Europe reveal significant
disparities in the level of undeclared work between affluent and deprived
as well as urban and rural populations (Leonard, 1994; Renooy, 1990;
Williams, 2005), maximum variation sampling was used to select four con-
trasting localities. Two were in Kiev, the capital: Perchersk, an affluent area,
heavily populated by government officials and the new business class, and
Vynogardar, a deprived neighbourhood comprising dilapidated Soviet-era
housing with high unemployment and widespread poverty. Also chosen
were a deprived rural area near Vasilikiv, which relied heavily on a nearby
refrigerator manufacturing plant for employment until this closed nearly 10
years ago and since then has suffered high unemployment, and Uzˇhgorod,
a town on the Ukrainian/Slovakia border and the capital of the Carpathian
region and where inhabitants complain that inflated prices caused by cross-
border trade mean that they cannot afford many goods and services.
A spatially stratified sample of 150 households was selected in each
locality. Thus if there were 3000 households in the area, the researcher
called at every 20th household. If there was no response or the inter-
viewer was refused an interview, then the neighbouring household was
visited. Table 1 provides a profile of the 600 respondents. Although this
is a relatively small sample size and is not nationally representative, it
nevertheless provides one of the first insights into the extent and nature
of undeclared work in contemporary Ukraine.
Given that previous research on undeclared work elsewhere in Europe
indicates that respondents find it difficult to recall instances of such
work when unstructured interviews are used, and that the resultant data
are often not comparable (Leonard, 1994; Williams, 2006a), a structured
interview schedule was used. Besides gathering background data on gross
household income, the employment status of household members, their
employment histories, ages and gender, respondents were asked about
the forms of work that they most rely on to maintain their living stand-
ard, the sources of labour that the household last used to complete 25 com-
mon domestic services, and whether they had undertaken any of these 
Williams: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
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25 tasks for others (either on a paid or unpaid basis) during the past year.
They were then asked open-ended questions about the forms of unde-
clared work that they had conducted and its relative importance to their
household income and finally, using five-point Likert scaling, attitudinal
questions concerning their ability to draw upon help from others and
their views of the economy, politics, everyday life and their future
prospects. This article focuses on the responses to the first and fourth sets
of questions, reporting first the extent, and second the nature of un-
declared work.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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TABLE 1. Socio-economic Profile of Respondents to Ukraine Survey on
Undeclared Work, 2005/06
Perchersk Vynogradar Vasilikiv Uzˇhgorod Total
No. of respondents 150 150 150 150 600
Age
0–16 0 1 0 0 0
16–25 9 21 10 30 18
26–35 29 26 25 11 23
36–45 28 26 24 24 25
46–55 21 12 19 23 19
56–65 3 9 11 6 7
65 10 5 11 6 8
Gender
Men 67 49 57 39 53
Women 33 51 43 61 47
Household employment
status
Multiple earner 65 55 51 61 58
Single earner 25 30 31 32 29
No earner: working age 2 5 3 2 3
No earner: retired 8 10 15 5 10
Work history of household
Continuous employment 60 48 62 48 55
of all
Mostly all employed 21 27 19 22 22
Mostly all unemployed 16 15 7 19 14
Continuously unemployed 3 10 12 11 9
Gross Household income
600 9 11 23 9 13
600–1399 29 28 66 39 41
1400–2199 25 26 8 28 22
2200–2999 15 13 2 11 10
3000–3800 10 12 0 5 7
3800 12 10 1 8 8
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The Extent of Undeclared Work
To understand the degree to which the surveyed population rely on unde-
clared work for their standard of living, respondents were asked to name
the form of work most important to them for achieving their standard of
living, along with the second most important. One in six (16.4 percent)
report that they primarily rely on undeclared work (see Table 2).
A further quarter who specify some other form of work as their prin-
cipal source of livelihood cite undeclared work as the second most
important contributor to their standard of living. Of these, some 28 per-
cent are primarily dependent on subsistence production, 22 percent on
mutual aid, 30 percent on formal employment and 14 percent on state
benefits. In total, therefore, some 40 percent of all Ukraine households
cite undeclared work as either the principal or second most important
contributor to their standard of living.
There are, however, socio-economic variations in the extent to which
different populations rely on undeclared work (see Table 3). Contrary to
the ‘marginality thesis’ that undeclared work is concentrated amongst such
populations such as the unemployed or people in deprived areas (Gallin,
2001; Kim, 2005), this survey finds that this is not the case. Just 12.5 percent
of no-earner households cite undeclared work as their primary strategy
compared with 23.5 percent of single-earner households and 13.9 percent
of multiple-earner households. Indeed, of all households primarily reliant
on undeclared work for their livelihood, some 51 percent are multiple-
earner households (58 percent of all households surveyed), 43 percent
single-earner households (29 percent of surveyed households) and just six
percent no-earner households (12 percent of surveyed households).
Williams: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
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TABLE 2. Primary and Secondary Most Important Source of Livelihood:
% of All Households
Secondary strategy
Self- Mutual Un- Employ- Benefits All
Primary provisioning aid declared ment
Strategy work
Self- 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.4 0.5 7.7
provisioning
Mutual aid 0.2 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0 4.5
Undeclared 3.4 4.1 1.5 6.0 1.4 16.4
work
Employment 10.3 17.5 18.4 9.5 5.7 61.4
Pension/ 2.9 4.1 1.4 0.5 1.0 9.9
Benefits
Source: 2005/06 Ukraine survey.
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Similarly, it is not the poorest households who primarily rely on un-
declared work; there is a fairly even distribution across the income spectrum;
and if anything, such work is more concentrated in the higher-income
brackets. Just 12.1 percent of households relying primarily on undeclared
work have a gross household income of less than 90 (UAH600) per month
(these represent 12.5 percent of all households), 35 percent earn 90–210
(41 percent of all households), 23 percent 210–330 (22 percent of all house-
holds), 13 percent earn 330–450 (10 percent of all households), seven per-
cent 450–570 (seven percent of all households) and 11 percent more than
this (seven percent of all households).
In terms of geographical disparities, deprived areas are not necessarily
more dependent on undeclared work. Although just 9.3 percent of
households in the affluent Kiev suburb rely primarily on undeclared
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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TABLE 3. Primary Sphere Relied on by Ukraine Households, 2005/6: 
By Type of Household
Primary strategy
% Self- Mutual Undeclared Formal Pension/
provisioning aid work employment benefits
Employment status
of household
Multiple earner 4.7 1.5 13.9 78.6 1.1
Single earner 8.4 4.8 23.5 56.0 7.2
No earner: 37.5 18.8 12.5 18.8 12.5
working age
No earner: 5.4 3.6 5.4 10.7 75.0
retired
Gross Household
Income/month
600 9.6 4.1 15.1 41.1 30.1
600–1399 6.7 3.3 13.4 61.9 14.6
1400–2199 6.6 4.1 17.3 71.1 0.8
2200–2999 3.4 1.7 18.6 73.3 1.7
3000–3799 10.2 2.6 15.4 69.2 2.6
3800  4.5 0 22.7 72.7 0
By locality
Kiev: affluent 4.7 2.0 9.3 72.4 11.4
area
Kiev: deprived 13.8 6.1 18.5 55.4 6.1
area
Rural area 7.4 3.3 11.4 63.8 14.1
Border town 2.0 1.4 24.4 62.6 9.5
Source: 2005/6 Ukraine survey.
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work compared with 18.5 percent in the deprived Kiev neighbourhood,
only 11.4 percent in the deprived rural area do so and 24.4 percent in the
relatively affluent border town of Uzˇhgorod. There is thus no simple cor-
relation between deprivation and undeclared work. This study thus re-
inforces the wealth of previous literature that has refuted the marginality
thesis both in western nations (Renooy, 1990; Williams, 2005) and tran-
sition economies (Rosser et al., 2000; Wallace and Latcheva, 2006).
Turning to the gendered nature of undeclared work, just 37 percent of
undeclared work is conducted by women, whose undeclared wage is on
average 33 percent less than men’s; thus undeclared work reinforces the gen-
der inequalities in the formal labour market. In part, however, this can be
explained by the fact that women are more likely to engage in undeclared
work for friends, neighbours and kin, which although lower paid is not
conducted purely for the purpose of financial gain. The types of task con-
ducted are also heavily gendered, again mirroring both the formal economy
and the gender division of domestic labour, with women engaged espe-
cially in personal and caring services such as child-care and domestic ser-
vice, and men undertaking construction and manufacturing-oriented activ-
ities. The nature of undeclared work is further investigated below.
Forms of Undeclared Work
The widespread recognition that undeclared work is not always con-
ducted by marginalized groups has challenged the conventional negative
depiction of such work as low-paid, exploitative and positioned at the
bottom of a hierarchy of types of employment. What has emerged is a
segmented undeclared labour market with a hierarchy of its own (Clarke,
2002; Neef, 2002; Williams and Windebank, 1998). Until now, this seg-
mented labour market has usually been depicted as composed of un-
declared employees working for businesses earning low wages and working
under exploitative conditions and those working on a self-employed basis
earning higher wages and with greater autonomy over their work (Castells
and Portes, 1989; Williams and Windebank, 1998). This Ukraine survey,
however, indicates the need for a richer and more textured understanding
of the diverse work relations involved in each of these two types of un-
declared work.
Undeclared Employees
Some 28 percent of all undeclared work identified in this survey involves
people working ‘off-the-books’ for a business, while some 25 percent of
all respondents asserted that they had engaged in such work over the past
year. Until now, one particular type of undeclared employee has been
Williams: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
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heavily emphasized in the literature on undeclared work, namely those
marginalized populations excluded from the formal labour market and
working under degrading, ‘sweatshop-like’ conditions, especially in the
garment manufacturing sector (Bender, 2004; Espenshade, 2004).
Although such employees cannot be ignored and instances were identi-
fied of people being employed in wholly off-the-books sweatshops, these
represent only a minor segment of all undeclared employees in Ukraine.
The typical undeclared employee in Ukraine is formally employed in a
legitimate organization, but receives part of the wage cash-in-hand, as Neef
(2002) also identifies in Romania and Sedlenieks (2003) in Latvia. This is a
practice that applies not just to lower-paid workers but across the income
spectrum. Indeed, some 30 percent of formal employees interviewed were
paid by their employer in such a manner. Although sometimes this cash-in-
hand element was for overtime, most of the time they were receiving a pro-
portion of their core wage in this manner. Very few employees were happy
with this arrangement. This was not because they had experienced problems
receiving this element of their wage – none said that this was the case – but
because receiving part of their wages in this manner affected their social
security and pension entitlements as well as their ability to apply for visas
to travel abroad and obtain credit, since their official wage was lower than
their actual wage. Although such a practice is common in Ukraine, the for-
mal procedures of institutions such as banks do not take it into formally
account when making decisions on loans (even if informally they do so). As
one respondent seeking a mortgage recounted, the bank informed him that
he would need seven guarantors because of his ‘low’ wages. Getting seven
people together was not a problem but as he stated:
all my work colleagues had pieces of paper with them that said they earn
only 300 per month, which was not enough for the bank. However, all
seven had SUV vehicles parked outside the building. We had to take the
bank manager outside to show them to him and say ‘this is what we really
earn’. In the end they agreed to give me the loan.
Besides those formal employees receiving a portion of their wage off-the-
books, another group of undeclared employees are those working for
businesses in which they do not hold a formal job. This takes many
forms, as Clarke (2002) has shown in Russia. On the one hand, there are
those working for wholly off-the-books businesses and on the other, and
more prevalent, those working for legitimate businesses that pay a por-
tion of their workforce on an undeclared basis. Such work was some-
times full-time but more often part-time, temporary or occasional. Some
70 percent hold a formal job and engage in such work on a temporary,
part-time or occasional basis to supplement their formal wages. Many
worked for construction companies, restaurants and manufacturing busi-
nesses, especially in the clothing industry.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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The remaining 30 percent working off-the-books for businesses in
which they do not hold a formal job are economically inactive or un-
employed. Often they are early retired. Examples of the work they under-
take are multifarious but include labouring in the construction industry,
taxi-driving, serving on market stalls, restaurant work and staffing assem-
bly lines in manufacturing. These tend to be the lowest-paid of all un-
declared workers. One early retired man, for example, regularly worked
24-hour shifts as a security guard in the block of flats in which he lived,
on a cash-in-hand basis to top up his state pension. The formally
employed security guard who unofficially subcontracted this work paid
him one-tenth of his salary.
The lesson from Ukraine, therefore, is that undeclared employees are
distributed across the income spectrum and engage work practices as var-
ied as those found in the formal labour market. The policy implications
are discussed below.
Undeclared Self-employment
Many engage in undeclared work on a self-employed basis; indeed, these
undertake some three-quarters (72 percent) of all the undeclared work
identified in this survey. Breaking this down in terms of the work relations
involved, some 24 percent (17 percent of all undeclared work) is conducted
by the self-employed on a for-profit basis for clients previously unknown
to, or only vaguely known by, them, whilst the remaining 76 percent
(55 percent of all undeclared work) is undertaken as a paid favour for
people previously known by them, and sometimes involves a wider range
of rationales than purely financial gain, such as helping others.
Given the earlier argument that a more enabling approach is emerging
towards undeclared work, not least because it is now being seen as a
seedbed for entrepreneurship and enterprise, it is important here to try to
identify its relative importance in this regard. How many self-employed,
for example, start-up their business ventures conducting some or all of
their transactions on an off-the-books basis? A previous study in Russia
finds that 26.5 percent of the new self-employed work on an undeclared
basis as a second job at the outset, indicating how the undeclared sphere is
an incubator for new self-employed businesses (Guariglia and Kim, 2006).
This Ukraine survey provides further evidence of how many enterprises
start-up (and continue to operate) in the undeclared sphere. Of all identified
as engaged in self-employment (some 298 individuals in total), 65 percent
did not have a licence to practise their trade on this basis. Some two-thirds
of the self-employed therefore operate as ‘ghosts’ unregistered by the state,
indicating that the tendency to start-up and continue working wholly off-
the-books is widespread. These ghosts, however, represent but one segment
of the self-employed working on an undeclared basis.
Williams: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
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Of those with a licence and therefore registered as self-employed,
some 85 percent reported conducting a portion of their trade on an un-
declared basis. Some 90 percent of all registered self-employed interviewed,
moreover, asserted that they had started-up their enterprises on a cash-
in-hand basis and that it was only once they became more established
that some of their trade had shifted into the legitimate sphere. This has
major policy implications. Given the current emphasis on new business
start-ups as a route to economic development, it strongly suggests that
deterring undeclared work will mean governments stamping out with one
hand precisely the entrepreneurship and enterprise that with another hand
they are so desperately seeking to nurture. This is not an issue for only a
small proportion of business start-ups; nine in 10 entrepreneurs who had
started-up a self-employed enterprise had done so on an undeclared basis
and some two-thirds of these had still not even registered their enterprises,
let alone declared any of their income to the state.
Despite this widespread tendency to operate wholly or partially off-
the-books, most would like to legitimize their operations. Reflecting the
opinion of the vast majority is a woman in her 40s who has established a
successful catering business:
I would like to have my own ‘legit’ business. I would be very proud …
People would look at me differently … but it is very difficult … Our
chinnovniki [bureaucrats] want money, money and more money but 
I cannot afford to do that … You must pay stupid tax rates and very high
rates for pensions … It simply doesn’t make sense. It is a shame because
it has always been my dream to be a khozyaika [enterprise owner], but it
isn’t to be. If I did have a ‘legit’ business though, I could then go to the
bank and take out a loan and expand … but because I am not formal,
they won’t give me any money.
The undeclared sphere is therefore not only the principal seedbed for
entrepreneurship and enterprise formation in Ukraine, but a vast pro-
portion of all business ventures remain wholly within its interstices. If
this large hidden enterprise culture were to be harnessed, it seems that
this would allow these entrepreneurs to develop and grow their busi-
nesses, something that at present they find very difficult.
This survey reveals, however, that an enabling approach that simply
attempts to transfer off-the-books work conducted on an autonomous
basis into the formal economy is insufficient. This is because not all such
work is conducted under a relationship akin to formal employment. 
A large proportion is conducted for neighbours, friends and kin under
work relations more like mutual aid. Although some ‘paid favours’ for
family, friends and neighbours are conducted solely for financial gain, the
vast majority are undertaken both to make money and to help out others.
For suppliers, paid favours are conducted to make a little money ‘on the
side’ but at the same time to provide some service to people they know
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who would otherwise be unable to get the job done. For consumers, mean-
while, people they know are often paid for performing some task in order
to redistribute money to them in a way that does not appear to be ‘charity’
and also to develop or cement social ties. Some 80 percent of customers,
if they had not employed the person to conduct this work, would either
have not had it done or would have performed it themselves. It therefore
seems highly unlikely that much of this undeclared work could be turned
into formal employment.
Some 55 percent of all undeclared work identified in this survey was of
this variety. Indeed, 18 percent of all undeclared work was for family liv-
ing outside the household, 23 percent for friends and 14 percent for neigh-
bours. These findings parallel those of a study in England, that much
undeclared work is conducted for close social relations for redistributive
purposes (Williams, 2004).
Of all instances where people provide favours to kin, friends and
neighbours, this survey reveals that some 41 percent involved payment.
To eradicate such paid favours would thus eliminate nearly half of all acts
of one-to-one reciprocity in Ukraine. Some 36 percent of exchanges with
relatives are paid, 56 percent of exchanges between neighbours and 46
percent of those between friends. Although some might suggest that a
laissez-faire approach of benign neglect could be adopted towards such
endeavour, this study suggests the need for caution. Not only would it be
difficult to distinguish between these paid favours that constitute over
half of all undeclared work in Ukraine, and profit-motivated undeclared
work, but also there are some significant socio-economic disparities.
Higher-income households give and receive some 41 percent more paid
favours than the average household, whilst the lowest-income house-
holds receive and provide just one half of the paid favours of the average
household. The implications are important.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Throughout Europe in general, the industrial relations problem of tackl-
ing undeclared work has moved to the top of the public policy agenda. In
Ukraine, solving this problem has been named as the top public policy
objective (Mission of Ukraine to European Communities, 2005; NRCU,
2005). The aim of this article has been to advance knowledge on the nature
of such work so that it can be tackled.
Although the specific national political–economic and social context of
Ukraine means that this country has a larger undeclared sector than those
in the EU-15, or indeed the CEE-8 (Schneider and Enste, 2000), and also
that some types of undeclared work will be relatively more prevalent (such
as formal employees receiving a proportion of their wages cash-in-hand
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because of a widespread perception of state corruption that results in low
tax compliance), there is no reason to suppose that the multiple forms of
undeclared work identified here in Ukraine do not exist in other European
nations. Indeed, although not so far mapped in such detail elsewhere, this
diversity is becoming increasingly apparent whenever the nature of un-
declared work is unpacked in other European nations (Clarke, 2002; Renooy
et al., 2004; Williams, 2004, 2006). What are the public policy implications
of this diverse nature of undeclared work?
Until now, a negative and narrow depiction of such work has informed
the dominant public policy approach in many nations, encouraging
efforts to deter participation by increasing punishments and detection
rates so as to change the cost–benefit calculation of participants. In
recent years, however, the recognition that the undeclared sphere may
inspire entrepreneurship and enterprise has led to calls for an approach to
harness rather than deter this hidden enterprise culture. This survey,
although based on a relatively small sample, has provided strong support
for such an approach, showing that some two-thirds of people setting up
business ventures operate wholly off-the-books, not even registering as
self-employed, and that the vast majority interviewed who had set up a
business had started it up by conducting at least a portion of their trans-
actions on an undeclared basis. Although such proportions are likely to
be lower elsewhere in Europe because of higher levels of tax morality,
this finding nonetheless reinforces the view that there is a need to shift
from deterring undeclared work to facilitating its formalization both in
Ukraine in particular and Europe more generally.
Nevertheless, too often such an enabling approach has taken the form
of a ‘low road’ policy to deregulate the formal economy through regula-
tory simplification and tax reductions (European Commission, 2003a;
Mission of Ukraine to European Communities, 2005; NCRU, 2005;
Novoseletsky, 2000). Adopting an enabling approach towards enterprise
and entrepreneurship in the undeclared sphere does not have to take this
form. A ‘high road’ approach could be adopted, seeking to bring the hid-
den enterprise culture into the formal economy by combining push ini-
tiatives (‘sticks’) in the form of deterrents and more effective detection
with pull initiatives (‘carrots’) to encourage these self-employed workers
to legitimize their operations. These range from supply-side incentives
(encouraging suppliers to formalize their undeclared work) including
society-wide amnesties, individual-level amnesties and advisory and sup-
port services to help micro-enterprises formalize; demand-side initiatives
to encourage customers to use formal rather than undeclared labour, such
as voucher schemes; and initiatives to improve tax morality and elicit par-
ticipation in the declared economy by replacing direct (compliance) with
indirect (commitment) control methods, in order to develop a ‘high com-
mitment society’ (Williams, 2006).
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Such a high road approach could also be applied to tackling undeclared
employees, a form of undeclared work that until now – because of its
‘sweatshop’ depiction – has been subjected solely to a deterrence
approach. If undeclared employees are to be tackled, however, then one
starting point is to deal with the widespread perception of corruption
amongst public officials. By increasing transparency in public life and
moving from indirect to direct control methods, coupled with amnesties,
support and advice, this widespread problem in Ukraine of employees
working on an undeclared basis might start to be resolved as tax morality
improves. Although the issue of state corruption is less prevalent else-
where in Europe, it is perhaps still the case that increasing transparency
about public spending and moving from indirect to direct control methods,
coupled with amnesties and business support, remain necessary initia-
tives if tax morality is to be improved.
Even if there were a switch to such a high-road approach, this would
still be insufficient for dealing with undeclared work. Since over half of
all undeclared work comprises paid favours more akin to mutual aid than
employment, and this is a principal means of providing one-to-one aid,
this cannot be transferred into the formal economy. What, therefore, is to
be done about this segment of the undeclared sphere? One option is to
turn a ‘blind eye’ to such endeavour by adopting a laissez-faire approach.
Although this might seem superficially appropriate, there are major
problems with this option. First, public officials throughout Europe
involved in tax collection will find it difficult to distinguish between
undeclared work conducted primarily for economic gain (which they are
seeking to encourage to ‘go formal’ using a combination of deterrents
and incentives) and paid favours (which they would be asked tacitly to
condone). A second important issue regarding the tacit condoning of
paid favours relates to the resultant continuation of the uneven distribu-
tion of such work. At present, that is, higher-income households receive
and undertake such work far more than lower-income households, as
shown above.
Another option, therefore, is to seek to facilitate its legitimization but
into the realm of legitimate mutual aid (rather than formal employment),
using policy initiatives that also facilitate the inclusion of those currently
unable to draw upon such social support networks. This could be
achieved by developing mutual-exchange systems that reflect the seem-
ingly emergent cultural tendency for payment to be made when people
conduct favours for each other, such as local exchange and trading
schemes (LETS), and exempting ‘favours’ in these systems from being
counted as income for tax and social security purposes. Indeed, one
recent evaluation found that some 35 percent of exchanges on LETS
would have been previously undertaken on an undeclared basis if the
LETS did not exist (Williams et al., 2001).
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The net result would be a move beyond a deterrence approach and
towards one which combines deterrents with a ‘high road’ enabling
approach that recognizes the multifarious nature of undeclared work and
provides push and pull initiatives both to help the hidden enterprise culture
and undeclared employees to move into the formal economy and to trans-
fer paid favours into a realm of legitimate mutual aid. Whether or not this
more enabling approach is deemed the appropriate way forward, it is now
certain that a deterrence approach cannot succeed. Governments, if they
persist with such an approach, will with each new initiative to deter un-
declared work destroy not only the self-employment and entrepreneurial
endeavour but also the active citizenship that they are seeking through
other policies to nurture. The richer and more textured understanding of
the diverse forms of undeclared work developed in this article demonstrates
the importance of developing more complex policy solutions for the differ-
ent forms of undeclared work, as well as the need to join-up policy in the
realms of undeclared work, entrepreneurship and active citizenship.
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